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Protesting Parties in Europe:
A comparative analysis
Endre Borbáth
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany; WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany
Swen Hutter
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Abstract
The article provides the first large-scale study of protest activities by political parties. The empirical analysis draws on
original protest event data for 30 European countries based on semi-automated coding of news agencies. The article
innovates by (a) proposing a standardized indicator for the extent to which protest and electoral politics relate to each
other, (b) showing that parties’ involvement in protests differs across political contexts, and (c) mapping the profile of a
typical party-sponsored event and a typical protesting party. Despite long-term trends toward differentiated modes of
interest intermediation, the results indicate that a wide range of parties does protest. However, in highly differentiated
contexts, the typical protesting party mirrors the outsider image of movement parties: it does not belong to a mainstream
party family and has no government experience. By contrast, more strategic factors, such as opposition status, drive
parties to the streets in less differentiated contexts.
Keywords
civil society, democratization, political parties, protest, representation
Introduction
Europe’s party systems are in flux, as indicated by
functionalist and structuralist perspectives on party compe-
tition. The functionalists point to aspects such as declining
party identification and increasing electoral volatility
(e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000), which skyrocketed in
countries hardest hit by the Great Recession (e.g. Dasson-
neville, 2018). The structuralists, by contrast, emphasize
emerging cleavages and the role of challenger parties in
articulating new oppositions (e.g. Bornschier, 2010; de
Wilde et al., 2019; Kriesi et al., 2012). Recent work in this
tradition shows how Europe’s latest crises have reinforced
long-term trends of part system transformation (e.g.
Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Rovny and Whitefield, 2019).
However, both perspectives neglect that the key driving
forces may not only have changed in programmatic terms
but also in organizational form and action repertoire. That
is, political parties seem to increasingly blur the lines
between electoral and protest politics. Following McAdam
and Tarrow’s (2010) forceful call almost a decade ago,
social movement scholars have thus returned to study the
manifold interactions between electoral and protest
dynamics (for an overview, see Hutter et al., 2019). Among
the Europeanists, we can identify two main strands: On the
one hand, some authors have taken up Kitschelt’s (2006:
280) concept of “movement parties,” defined as coalitions
of activists who emanate from social movements and try to
apply movements’ organizational and strategic practices in
the electoral arena. Studying cases from the political left—
such as Podemos or Syriza (e.g. della Porta et al., 2017)—
and from the political right—such as Jobbik or the
Alternative for Germany (e.g. Caiani and Cı́sař, 2019; Pirro
et al., 2019)—these scholars aptly describe the fuzzy
empirical boundaries between political parties and social
movements, while indicating the transitional status of such
hybrid entities. On the other hand, other scholars have
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approached the topic from a more systemic and program-
matic perspective, linking the study of issue agendas in
protest and electoral politics (e.g. Cı́sař and Vráblı́ková,
2019; Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2018; Walgrave and Vlie-
genthart, 2019). This research provides ample evidence on
the close yet varying coupling of protest agendas and par-
ties’ activities during electoral campaigns and in
parliament.
Missing from this emerging field of research is a
large-scale comparative analysis that maps and explains
the varying extent of party-movement interactions. A key
reason for the absence of such large-N work is the lack of
comparable cross-national data. Another one is the lack of
established standardized measures to examine the phenom-
enon at hand. In this article, we innovate by providing a
standardized indicator of the extent to which protest and
electoral politics relate to each other across 30 European
democracies and over 16 years (2000–2015). More specif-
ically, we concentrate on the extent to which political parties
sponsor protest activities in the streets. Following Rucht
(1998: 41), we broadly define sponsorship as (co-)organiz-
ing, taking part in and/or calling for participation in a protest
event. As any standardized indicator for large-scale cross-
national comparisons, the extent of party-sponsored protests
comes at the cost of reducing complexity. Most importantly,
the indicator emphasizes the action component over more
organizational or ideational relations.1 Nevertheless, we con-
sider our study an important complement to the cited case
studies on movement parties and the small-N cross-national
comparisons of issue agendas.
We innovate, moreover, by embedding our original
empirical endeavor in a theoretical framework that builds
on Kitschelt’s (2003) ideas of ever-more differentiated
modes of interest intermediation in advanced democracies.
It is under such conditions that the emergence of movement
parties is seen as atypical and transitional (Kitschelt, 2006:
280). We elaborate on the scope conditions of Kitschelt’s
argument to explain the varying extent of party-sponsored
protests across European countries. We also deduce expec-
tations about differences in the type of sponsored protests
(“what?”) and the type of sponsoring party (“by whom?”)
depending on the level of party-sponsored protests, that is,
on the level of arena differentiation. Our related research
questions are as follows: To what extent do parties mobilize
in the protest arena? What types of protest events do parties
sponsor? What does the typical “protesting party” in Eur-
ope look like? And how do the types of events and parties
differ depending on the level of party-sponsored protests?
Our results underscore that party-sponsored protests are
an important feature of contemporary protest politics in
Europe. However, the extent to which political parties are
major players in the protest arena varies considerably
across countries, mirroring differences in democratic his-
tory and the strength of civil society. In line with parties’
incentives, we also find significant differences in the types
of events sponsored by parties. Compared to the average
protest in a country, they are less radical, larger, and more
likely to address the so-called cultural issues or the func-
tioning of the political system. This difference is most pro-
nounced in highly differentiated contexts, that is, in
contexts where party-sponsored protests are relatively rare.
Similarly, the type of protesting party varies across con-
texts. In highly differentiated contexts, the typical protest-
ing party in Europe mirrors the “outsider image” of
movement parties much more than in less differentiated
ones. Overall, our study adds quantitative insights on
cross-national variations for a better understanding of
party–movement interactions which should be incorporated
into more case study-based designs.
Theoretical framework and expectations
Why? The extent of party-sponsored protests
across contexts
While McAdam and Tarrow (2010) and the cited studies
that followed in their footsteps have identified manifold
interactions between protest and electoral politics, the
dominant view in electoral and party research is one of
separation and a division of labor. Why is this? To explain
this standard view, we depart from Kitschelt’s (2003) idea
that we have witnessed an increasing differentiation in the
patterns of interest intermediation since the end of the
“Golden Age” of Western capitalism (see also Kitschelt,
2006: 278–281). According to Kitschelt (2003: 89): “The
progressive differentiation of modes of collective interest
mobilization and growing separation of political entrepre-
neurs in movements, interest groups, and parties from each
other is the big story of the last third of the twentieth cen-
tury in European democracies.”
Kitschelt (2003) explains differentiation as a product of
the learning processes of political entrepreneurs and their
followers, which have been underpinned by economic,
social, and political–institutional changes. Two challenges
faced by political entrepreneurs are of crucial importance
for the argument: problems of collective action and social
choice. In contrast to social movements and interest groups,
political parties are portrayed as the actors who have
invested the most in solving both types of problems. Parties
frame their goals as long-term, durable, and encompassing
programs, and they have invested most in techniques of
collective preference alignment (e.g. formal rules for
aggregating individual preferences into organizational
purposes). In the long run, actors who have invested dif-
ferently in solving the two problems are better equipped to
compete in specific political arenas. Regarding the extent
of party-sponsored protests, Kitschelt (2003: 97) argues,
“parties focus increasingly on electoral competition, at the
expense of interest group representation or social move-
ment protest actions [ . . . ]. Social movements, finally,
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concentrate on public actions outside institutionalized
arenas of bargaining to affect public opinion and political
elites through the media.”
In general, the differentiation argument lets us expect
that party-sponsored protests are the exception rather than
the rule in contemporary European democracies. However,
as we emphasize in this article, two scope conditions of the
argument are important regarding cross-national variation:
a long democratic history and the strength of civil society.
Both conditions appear to be crucial for the establishment
of functionally differentiated arenas that are populated by
specialized political actors. As argued before, Kitschelt
(2003) highlights a long-term process which began in the
1970s that has resulted in a twofold transformation of Eur-
opean party systems: a first wave driven by the mobiliza-
tion of new social movements and left-libertarian parties in
the 1970s and a second wave driven by the mobilization of
the populist radical right since the 1990s (Kriesi et al.,
2012). Based on the scholarly literature, we know that these
transformations have been much less pronounced in the
countries in Southern and Eastern Europe (Borbáth and
Gessler, 2020; Hutter and Kriesi, 2019). Overall, we thus
expect that party-sponsored protests are more likely in
countries with a shorter democratic history, given that the
learning processes at the core of the differentiation argu-
ment take time and depend on a democratic context.
Second, closely related condition, the development of a
strong and independent civil society and social movement
sector relates to the other side of the equation. Even if
parties withdraw from certain sites of mobilization, there
needs to be other collective political organizations with the
capacity to fill the void. The strength of civil society over-
laps to some extent with the life span of democracy. Post-
communist countries are characterized by lower levels of
participation, often seen to be the result of low levels of
social and interpersonal trust originating from a totalitarian
past, as well as of the non-transparent and elite-driven
transition processes (Bernhard, 1996; Howard, 2003).
However, a second strand of literature analyzing non-
participatory aspects of civil society suggests the presence
of influential organizations able to defend democratic insti-
tutions (Foa and Ekiert, 2017). Instead of relying on mass
mobilization to gain support for their causes, these organi-
zations use their connection to power holders to exercise
leverage on the decision-making processes (Petrova and
Tarrow, 2007). Both perspectives agree on the relative lack
of organizations able to mobilize on the streets, which leads
us to expect that party-sponsored protests are more likely in
contexts where civil society participation is lower.
What? The type of sponsored protests across
contexts
Parties not only decide whether to avoid or to participate in
a protest but in the former case, they also need to settle
what form their participation should take. Differentiation
leads us to expect that party-sponsored protest events are
systematically different than protest events organized by
social movements or other organizations for two reasons
(Somma, 2018). Firstly, from the perspective of parties as
vote- or policy-seeking organizations, their fortune is deter-
mined by the dynamics in the electoral arena. Therefore,
parties’ participation in the protest arena should be instru-
mental to their electoral goals and, most likely, a function
of the electoral incentives they face. Secondly, from the
perspective of other organizations that mobilize in the pro-
test arena, parties represent institutionalized politics which
they challenge. Therefore, aligning themselves with parties
represents a risky strategy with the potential to alienate
their supporters. Given these tensions, party-sponsored pro-
tests might differ from other, typical events in the protest
arena in several key dimensions.
We expect parties to sponsor events that have the poten-
tial to be attended by many participants. Consequently,
they might stay away from forms of mobilization associ-
ated with disruption. Violent events, confrontations, or
blockades are unlikely to gain universal recognition among
the electorate of even the more radical parties. In contrast,
peaceful demonstrations or petitions are less stigmatized
forms of protest behavior and are potentially attended by
a relatively large and often diverse group of citizens
(Somma, 2018: 70). For similar reasons, party-sponsored
protests might be more likely in times of increased protest
mobilization. Such a context provides the opportunity for
parties to “ride the wave” and benefit from a general
increase in protest (e.g. Peña and Davies, 2017). It allows
them to connect and build alliances with social movements
and other actors who are already mobilizing on the streets.
For this reason, we expect parties to sponsor peaceful
events in times of increasing protest mobilization, benefit-
ting from the opportunity to gain exposure and support
from potential voters. In addition, we expect party-
sponsored protests to follow the electoral cycle as well.
During electoral campaigns, that is, in intensified periods
of competition, parties invest in mobilizing their support-
ers. In this context, organizing on the streets by sponsoring
protest events has the potential of paying off most in terms
of vote shares. Finally, taking party-sponsored protests as a
phenomenon associated with the two waves of party system
transformation highlighted above, we expect parties to
mobilize more on cultural rather than economic issues. The
ability of parties to benefit from the changing context of
competition and keeping their role as the main agents of the
transformation might hinge on their presence in both arenas
of mass mobilization.
In addition, we expect that where political parties are the
main agents of both electoral and protest mobilization, the
events they sponsor differ less from protests staged by other
actors. However, in contexts of high differentiation, where
parties’ share in protest is lower, the typical party-
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sponsored protest is more likely to reflect the logic
sketched above: less disruptive, larger, more in sync with
the electoral cycle, and more related to so-called cultural
issues than non-party-sponsored events.
Who? The type of parties sponsoring protests across
contexts
Another crucial element in understanding the rationale
behind party-sponsored protests is the focus on which polit-
ical parties are most likely to take to the streets. At this
stage, it is helpful to combine Kitschelt’s differentiation
argument with his further elaborations on movement par-
ties (Kitschelt, 2006; also see: Caiani and Cı́sař, 2019; della
Porta et al., 2017; Pirro et al., 2019). As emphasized ini-
tially, movement parties represent a specific organizational
form characterized by the lack of investment in solving
problems of social choice and collective action and, in this
regard, resemble social movements both in organizational
form and in action repertoire. In Kitschelt’s (2006: 281)
understanding, movement parties emerge as the result of
a mismatch between the arena where political entrepre-
neurs mobilize, their organizational resources, and the nar-
row focus of their claim. They do not represent a durable
form of mobilization, but a transitional phenomenon, most
likely to appear in moments of party system
transformations.
The two examples Kitschelt gives are linked to the
aforementioned transformation of Western European party
systems: the rise of the greens and the radical right. In both
cases, movement parties appeared for a brief period. As
they became electorally successful, they invested in
expanding their organizational basis and in developing a
more encompassing programmatic appeal. One of the aims
of this article is to examine the extent to which protest
sponsoring is restricted to parties with programmatic, stra-
tegic, and organizational traits associated with movement
parties, or whether protest is used by parties of all stripes.
Our key claim is that in the context of high differentia-
tion—the one Kitschelt (2003, 2006) portrays—the typical
protesting party comes closer to the ideal type of a move-
ment party.
First, we expect that parties challenging the mainstream
in a party system in programmatic terms are the primary
actors involved in protest politics. In line with Kitschelt’s
(2006) focus, green and radical right parties, that is, the
drivers of the first and the second wave of party system
transformation, are the most important in this respect. On
the one hand, they are the main agents politicizing the
issues related to the cultural dimension of competition in
the electoral arena and extend the scope of contestation in
the protest arena as well. On the other hand, these types of
parties often originate from social movements. Having
been excluded from the government for a relatively long
period helped them maintain links with their grassroots
base. Even after they were co-opted by the mainstream,
their organizational features (e.g. Bailey, 2017: 139–151),
as well as ideological profile, make them the likely candi-
dates to mobilize in both arenas.
Second, we expect that, apart from adopting non-
mainstream positions, factors resulting from the configura-
tion of power in the electoral arena play a decisive role.
Most importantly, parties face different strategic incentives
depending on whether they are currently in government or
whether they have ever been in government—the latter
often termed challenger parties (de Vries and Hobolt,
2020). Governing parties are constrained by established
policies and the diverse societal needs that they need to
consider in their activities. By contrast, opposition parties
have more leeway to respond to citizens’ demands and to
build broad social support coalitions. Klüver and Spoon
(2016), for example, show that opposition parties respond
more strongly to shifts in voters’ issue priorities than gov-
ernment parties. Hutter and Vliegenthart’s (2018) results
indicate that opposition parties are more likely to respond
to the signals from protesters in their parliamentary activ-
ities than government parties. Thus, we also expect that
opposition parties are more likely to join forces with less
institutionalized actors and to directly mobilize on the
streets to challenge the government.2 This effect should
be strongest for parties without any government experience
at all.
Finally, the movement party concept is also associated
with a certain type of organizational model. As stated in the
introduction, this is increasingly important in an era when
parties seem to be in decline (Dalton and Wattenberg,
2000) and when we observe a more diverse organizational
landscape—a landscape composed of parties which have
abandoned the mass-party model and those that still adhere
to it (e.g. Katz and Mair, 1995; Rohrschneider and White-
field, 2012; Scarrow et al., 2017). As Katz and Mair (1995:
8) highlight, the ideal–typical mass party is considered part
of civil society aiming at “breaking into the state and mod-
ifying public policy in the long-term interests of the con-
stituency to which it is accountable.” To do so, mass parties
rely on their own channels of communication and adopt a
bottom-up organizational approach as party elites are
accountable to party members which also provide the prin-
cipal resources by means of fees and contributions. In their
conceptualization of “mass parties,” Rohrschneider and
Whitefield (2012: 118) add relations with civic associations
to Duverger’s (1959) original focus on a large membership
base and complex organizational apparatus. Their empiri-
cal analysis of party–voter congruence indicates that, in
Western (but not Eastern) Europe, parties with mass orga-
nizations are ideologically closer to partisan and indepen-
dent voters than parties without such organizational
features. Relatedly, we expect a positive relationship
between mass-party organizations and our dependent vari-
able of party-sponsored protests, given the stronger
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linkages of mass parties to other civic associations, their
stronger reliance on members, and their stronger organiza-
tional capacities more generally.
To sum up, we expect the typical protest-sponsoring
party in Europe to be non-mainstream, challenger, and
(still) adopting a mass-party organization. As for the typical
party-sponsored event, we expect to observe stronger
effects in highly differentiated contexts, where the level
of party-sponsored protest is lower. That is, in such a con-
text, the typical party sponsoring protest events is expected
to be a distinct entity, coming closer to the features asso-
ciated with the movement party model. In contexts with
less differentiated arenas, we expect that the range of spon-
soring parties is more diverse in programmatic, strategic,
and organizational terms.
Data and methods
Having outlined why the extent of party-sponsored protests
may differ across European countries and how that may
affect the type of sponsored events and the type of political
party we observe in the streets, we now turn to the strategy
used to test our claims. One of the main reasons why party-
sponsored protests have not yet been studied comparatively
is the lack of large-scale protest event data sets covering
multiple countries over time. For this reason, we collected
an original protest event data set based on the coverage of
English-language newswires. In general, protest event anal-
ysis—as a type of content analysis of media sources—has
been one of the major advances in the field of protest and
social movement research as it allows for quantitative anal-
ysis of protest in a cross-sectional and longitudinal setting
(for a review, see Hutter, 2014).
Data were collected with semi-automated tools in a joint
effort by the ERC project “Political Conflict in Europe in
the Shadow of the Great Recession (POLCON)” at the
European University Institute and the SNF project “Years
of Turmoil” at the University of Zurich. It is based on the
coverage of 10 English-language newswires (on the data
collection, see Kriesi et al., forthcoming, and Online
Appendix A). The data set covers protests in 30 European
countries: all European Union member states (apart from
Croatia), Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland during a 16-
year period from 2000 to 2015. The data set covers
17,048 protest events with an organizational sponsor which
involved around 268 million participants. The data set
includes information on the date, the size, the form (demon-
stration, petition, strike, violent, blockade), the claim (eco-
nomic, culturally libertarian/conservative, political in
terms of a close connection to the functioning of the polit-
ical system, e.g., anti-corruption rallies), and the organizer
(parties, unions, other organizations) of the event. Based on
the date of the event, we create two indicators to identify
protest events which happened in the half a year period
before a national parliamentary or presidential election or
during the half-year after. We also created an indicator of
“big events” to identify the events attended by more than
100,000 participants.
As stated initially, we adopt a broad definition of spon-
sorship referring to instances when parties (co-)organize,
take part in, and/or call for participation in a protest event.
Such a definition goes clearly beyond the support of the
claims of protests and includes support of the action form
as well. Thus, it represents a standardized measure to get
closer to the extent to which protest and electoral politics
are related to each other. However, it does not allow us to
differentiate whether parties play a significant role in the
organization of the protest event or not. As Rucht (1998:
41) highlighted some time ago, such fine-grained measures
are beyond the scope of a protest event analysis based on
media reports.
Overall, 13% of all protest events in our data set have
been sponsored by parties. We matched each of the
sponsoring parties with the ParlGov data set (Döring and
Manow, 2018) to gain further information about the vote
share, ideology, party family, as well as opposition/gov-
ernment status of each party. More specifically, we rely
on three ideological scales: a general left–right scale, an
economic left–right scale, and a cultural libertarian–
authoritarian scale.3 We code parties as mainstream if
they were classified by ParlGov as Christian-democrat,
conservative, liberal, or social democrat. To gain infor-
mation on the extent to which a party organization
resembles that of a mass party, we rely on an expert
survey conducted by Rohrschneider and Whitefield
(2012) in 2008/2013.4 We replicate their indicator and
rely on an additive index of four, equally weighting
items in which experts are asked to evaluate (1) how
strong the party apparatus and (2) the party membership
is in determining policy (seven-point scale), (3) whether
the party has a “significant membership base” relative to
the other parties in the system (dichotomous), and (4)
whether the party is organizationally affiliated with any
interest/civil society group, including, but not limited to
trade unions, business associations and church groups
(dichotomous).
To measure the two contextual features introduced
before, we rely on the period of democratization and the
strength of civil society. We distinguish Northwestern Eur-
opean countries which democratized before or in the imme-
diate aftermath of the Second World War from Southern
European and Eastern European countries included in the
second and respectively third wave of democratization. To
measure the strength of civil society, we rely on the expert
survey-based “core” civil society index of V-Dem
(v2xcs_ccsi, see Coppedge et al., 2017). The measure is
an aggregate index of three indicators: civil society entry/
exit, civil society repression, and civil society participatory
environment. The index was designed to reflect the robust-
ness of civil society understood as an autonomous sphere
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where citizens are active and free to pursue their political
and/or civic goals, however conceived.
Empirical results
To begin with, Figure 1 shows the level of party-sponsored
protest as a function of the context in which they take place.
To do so, we show the average share of party-sponsored
protests depending on the strength of civil society and dem-
ocratic history. For the latter, we broadly distinguish
between Northwestern, Southern, and Eastern European
countries.5
As the results show, relative to a context with strong civil
society (where parties are only present in a little over 10% of
all protests), the share of party-sponsored protests doubles in
a context where civil society is comparatively weak, and it
reaches over 20%. Regarding the timing of democratization,
the results are very similar in Northwestern and Southern
Europe. In both regions, parties are on average sponsoring a
little over 10% of all observed protest events. Based on this
result, Southern Europe passed the threshold of having a
differentiated landscape of interest intermediation. In con-
trast, the share of party-sponsored protests is substantially
higher in Eastern Europe, where parties are present in 23%
of the protest events. To examine the interaction of the
strength of civil society and the timing of democratization,
we checked the extent to which the weakness of civil society
leads to a larger share of party-sponsored protests in each
region individually. The result included in Online Appendix
E shows that the two factors have a separate, additive effect
on the level of party-sponsored protest.
Turning to country differences and the relationship
between parties’ involvement and overall levels of protest
mobilization, we examine the share of party-sponsored pro-
tests relative to the total number of events per country. As
Figure 2 indicates, the relationship between the share of
party-sponsored protests and the overall protest mobiliza-
tion in a country is curvilinear. Parties are unlikely to dom-
inate the protest arena in countries where protest is rare and
in countries where protest is frequent. The figure also
reveals the suspected regional clusters. While Northwes-
tern European countries are diverse regarding the level of
protest, the share of party-sponsored protests is relatively
low. The Southern European countries are even more
diverse regarding the overall level of protest—with Greece,
Spain, and Italy having the highest and Cyprus, Malta, and
Portugal the lowest level of mobilization—but are very
similar in having an average level of party presence. The
Eastern European countries have a low-to-average level of
protest, but they are the ones where the share of party-
sponsored protest reaches its highest levels. Overall, our
results indicate a limited ability for parties to ride the wave
of mobilization: for parties to become the dominant actors
in protest, there needs to be some level of protest mobiliza-
tion, but above a certain threshold they are crowded out
Figure 1. The share of party-sponsored protests in context. The
level of party-sponsored protests is calculated as the share of
party-sponsored protests in percent of all organized protests in
a given context. The events are weighted by the countries’ log
population and the press agency weight—see Online Appendix A.
We rely on the median value at the country level to distinguish
between contexts with low and high strength of civil society—see
Online Appendix C.
Figure 2. The share of party-sponsored protests and overall level
of protest mobilization. The level of party-sponsored protests is
calculated as a share of party-sponsored protests from all orga-
nized protests in a country. The events are weighted by the coun-
tries’ log population number and the press agency weight—see
Online Appendix A. The symbols distinguish between Northwes-
tern, Southern, and Eastern Europe. The curve shows a LOESS
regression smoother. In Online Appendix E, Figure 2 replicates
the figure using the total number of protest participants.
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(also confirmed when looking at participation numbers, see
Online Appendix E).
We now turn to the type of protest event that parties
sponsor. As previously discussed, we expect party-
sponsored protests to differ from other protest events, espe-
cially in a context of high differentiation (¼ low levels of
party sponsorship). To examine the moderating role of a
differentiated landscape of interest intermediation, we split
our sample into two groups. We consider countries where
the share of party-sponsored protest is above the 11% med-
ian threshold as weakly differentiated, whereas we code
countries below the median as strongly differentiated (see
Online Appendix C).6
To map the characteristics of party-sponsored protests,
we calculated the share of different event characteristics
among all party-sponsored events (see Figure 3). In gen-
eral, the results indicate that party-sponsored protests
share important features across both contexts. First, most
party-sponsored protests are addressing cultural demands,
and only a smaller fraction of them address economic
issues. Second, over 85% of them are non-confrontational
or violent (with over two-third taking the form of public
demonstrations). Third, party-sponsored protests are
sometimes co-organized with other organizations, but in
more than 70% of the cases parties are reported as the only
organizational sponsor. Finally, a substantive share of the
party-sponsored events falls into the category of “big
events”, defined as events with more than 100,000 parti-
cipants. The most pronounced cross-context differences
refer to the larger share of co-organized (29% vs. 18%)
and big events (28% vs. 18%) in more differentiated
contexts.
To what extent and how do party-sponsored protests
differ from non-party-sponsored events? To answer this
question, we ran logistic regression models with party-
sponsorship as the dependent variable. All models include
country fixed effects and standard errors clustered by
country. As a function of the level of party sponsorship,
we split the sample between contexts of high and low
differentiation, but we also conducted models with inter-
actions. To ease the interpretation of the results, we pres-
ent coefficient plots and include the regression tables in
Online Appendix B.
The results of the regression analysis in Figure 4 support
the expectation that party-sponsored protests are more
likely to center on cultural and political issues than
Figure 3. Characteristics of party-sponsored protest events. We distinguish low differentiation contexts with a high share of party
protests, from high differentiation contexts with a low share of party protests based on the national level median value—see Online
Appendix C. The events are weighted by the countries’ log population and the press agency weight—see Online Appendix A.
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economic ones. Also, political parties are likely to organize
protests alone, and these protests take the form of demon-
strations or petitions rather than strikes (for details, see
Online Appendix B). In line with our expectations, we find
a more clear-cut picture in highly differentiated contexts,
where party-sponsored protests are less prominent in
the protest arena. In such contexts, party-sponsored
protests are also less confrontational or violent than
non-party-sponsored events, and they are more in sync with
the electoral cycle. More specifically, our results suggest
that political parties are more likely to take it to the streets
shortly before and after Election Day in highly differen-
tiated contexts, whereas we find no statistically significant
electoral cycle effects in less differentiated contexts. We
also modeled the likelihood of party-sponsored protests as a
function of the overall flow of protest mobilization over
time. Similar to the cross-national pattern in Figure 2, we
observe a curvilinear relationship in countries with low
differentiation (see the results in Table 1 of Online Appen-
dix B). In differentiated contexts, by contrast, party-
sponsored protests seem to develop independently from the
overall dynamics of protest mobilization. We take these
results as evidence of our two key expectations: party-
sponsored protests are systematically different from other
types of protest events, and the differences we expected
regarding form, issues, and timing are stronger in a context
of high differentiation (¼low levels of such party-
sponsored events).
Turning to the type of political parties that are sponsor-
ing protests, we again start with some descriptive findings.
This time we calculated the share of different party char-
acteristics among all party-sponsored events.7 Figure 5
shows that most protests are sponsored by parties that do
not belong to the political mainstream in terms of their
party family or which have no government experience.8
Importantly, in contexts of low differentiation, 44% of all
party-sponsored protest events are organized by main-
stream parties, whereas in highly differentiated contexts,
their share only reaches 33%. The share of parties with
executive experience also drops from 26% to 20%. More-
over, more than 80% of all party-sponsored events are
being organized by parties in opposition.
The descriptive findings tend to support our expecta-
tions of the typical protesting party in Europe. However,
Figure 4. Impact of event and context characteristic on party-sponsorship—logistic regression. Coefficients plotted as odds ratios.
Standard errors clustered by country. Observations are weighted by the countries’ log population number and the press agency
weight—see Online Appendix A. We distinguish low differentiation contexts with a high share of party protests, from high differentia-
tion contexts with a low share of party protests based on the national level median value—see Online Appendix C. The model also
includes overall protest, overall protest squared, length of government, and country fixed effects. Following the advice of Bolsen and
Thornton (2014), we calculate 84% confidence intervals which in case they do not overlap indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.05
level. See the corresponding regression in Table 1 of Online Appendix B.
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we had to construct a party-level data set to systematically
compare the involvement of different parties across con-
texts. To do so, we calculated the number of times a par-
ticular party sponsored an event during a cabinet.9 We find
that a large number of parties sponsor protest: overall, there
are 266 parties from the 30 countries under scrutiny which
at some point from 2000 to 2015 protested. Unfortunately,
only 137 of them were included in the expert survey on
party organizations. The estimates presented in Figure 6 are
based on this subset of the sample, but the effects for the
other variables remain the same for the larger sample of
266 protesting parties (see Online Appendix D). To explore
the variation of the types of parties protesting, we ran OLS
regression models with country-fixed effects and standard
errors clustered by country. The units of analysis are polit-
ical parties and the dependent variable is the number of
events a party sponsored during the term of a government.
We also controlled for the duration of the government.
Figure 6 presents the results graphically (for the regression
tables, see Online Appendix B).
Our key expectation regarding the profile of protesting
parties referred to their resemblance to movement parties,
that is, they belong to the green or radical right party
family, are in opposition, without government experience,
and adopt a mass-party organization. In general, the
regression results in Figure 6 reinforce our descriptive
findings. We find that parties are more likely to take it
to the streets if they belong to non-mainstream party
families and are in the opposition. At the same time, the
results underline that the effects for government
experience and mass-party organization only point to the
expected direction in more differentiated contexts. In less
differentiated contexts, political parties with a wider vari-
ety of organizational models tend to sponsor protest
events, and having a history of government participation
even shows a small positive effect. Interestingly, the
opposite holds when looking at the effects of the current
configuration of power. It turns out that opposition status
has an even larger positive effect on protest sponsorship
in less differentiated systems. The finding points to the
importance of strategic factors rather than the more struc-
tural features associated with movement parties in
explaining which parties are likely to take it to the streets
in such a context.
Conclusion
In this article, we presented the first large-scale compara-
tive analysis of parties’ involvement in protest politics,
covering 30 countries and the years 2000–2015. In doing
so, we aimed to contribute to the literature on party system
change. This literature highlights the transformations that
party organizations and systems have witnessed since the
1970s, and it argues that we are faced with an ever-more
complex party landscape. However, it tends to give short
shrift to parties’ activities outside the electoral arena. More
specifically, we contributed to the emerging scholarly lit-
erature on party-movement interactions in three respects:
First, by proposing a standardized indicator for the extent to
which protest and electoral politics relate to each other;
Figure 5. Type of parties sponsoring protests. The share of protests sponsored by parties of different type is calculated as a percentage of
all party-sponsored protests organized on a context of low respectively high differentiation. We distinguish low differentiation contexts
with a high share of party protests from high differentiation contexts with a low share of party protests based on the national level median
value—see Online Appendix C. The events are weighted by the countries’ log population number and the press agency weight.
Borbáth and Hutter 9
second, by showing that parties’ involvement in protests
differs across political contexts; and third, by mapping the
profile of a typical party-sponsored event and a typical
protesting party.
Using parties’ relative presence in protest as a standar-
dized indicator of the relationship between electoral and
protest politics, we were able to test and qualify Kitschelt’s
(2003, 2006) argument about increasingly differentiated
landscapes of interest intermediation. Overall, we find that
a relatively diverse set of parties does take it to the streets.
We also highlight that parties’ protest activities differ across
contexts in terms of its level and character. The differentia-
tion of interest intermediation is a development specific to
established democracies with a strong civil society. In con-
trast, parties are more dominant outside of their home arena
in Eastern Europe, where democratization happened later
and participation in civil society organizations is lower.
In highly differentiated contexts, where parties are less
significant protest sponsors, party-sponsored events are
predominantly peaceful demonstrations, often well-
attended, co-organized, concern cultural issues, and are
in sync with the electoral cycle. Although a relatively
large variety of parties protests in this context as well, the
typical protesting party mirrors the outsider image of
movement parties (Kitschelt, 2006): it does not belong
to a mainstream party family and has no government
experience. Therefore, the typical protesting party we find
in this context corresponds to the profile of parties
described in the literature as challenger parties (e.g. de
Vries and Hobolt, 2020) and as main agents of cleavage
transformation (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2012).
In less differentiated contexts, where parties are more
likely to be dominant actors in protest politics, the type of
party-sponsored events and the character of protesting
parties are more diverse. The events are more likely to
be confrontational, often rather small, and organized by
the parties alone. Parties in less differentiated contexts
mobilize when there is some protest on the streets, but
protest activity has not yet reached its peak. Their pres-
ence also appears to be fairly independent of the electoral
calendar. Protesting parties in this region are more often
from the political mainstream, with some governing expe-
rience, but currently in opposition. In this regard, parties
tend to follow a more strategic logic in deciding when to
mobilize on the streets than the outsider image of move-
ment parties would suggest.
Figure 6. Impact of party characteristics on sponsorship of protest events—OLS regression. Standard errors clustered by country.
Observations are weighted by the countries’ log population number and the press agency weight—see Online Appendix A. We
distinguish low differentiation contexts with a high share of party protests from high differentiation contexts with a low share of party
protests based on the national level median value—see Online Appendix C. The model also includes overall protest, overall protest
squared, length of government, and country fixed effects. Following the advice of Bolsen and Thornton (2014), we calculate 84%
confidence intervals which in case they do not overlap indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level. See the corresponding
regression in Tables 2 and 3 of Online Appendix B.
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We believe that by showing what type of protest events
parties sponsor, which type of parties choose to protest, and
under what conditions, the article provides a useful model
for reconnecting party and social movement research. In a
time of high volatility, decreasing turnout, and growing
mistrust in parties, protests and social movements are
ever-more seen as a potential source of democratic innova-
tion. By showing the blurred boundaries between arenas of
interest intermediation, our study highlights the interdepen-
dence and strategic use of protest mobilization by political
parties. While parties may be able to channel the demands
of the street in institutionalized decision-making processes,
their presence threatens to appropriate the claims of protest
movements and to narrow the space for radical political
alternatives. At the same time, protest sponsorship might
add to the resilience of political parties, providing them
with one foot on the street and another in parliament. How-
ever, future research should account for the strong cross-
context variations revealed by our study when interpreting
specific cases of party-movement interactions and their
consequences.
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Notes
1. Note that by emphasizing “actions”, we follow a long tradition
in the study of social movements and contentious politics
(Tilly and Tarrow, 2015: 39).
2. The government-opposition dynamics can also be interpreted
as a “sore loser effect” because opposition parties—especially
large ones—have been close to power without managing to
gain office (on the winner–loser gap, see Anderson et al.,
2005). Therefore, thinking about party-sponsored protest as
responses to (re)connect with society and to increase vote
shares, we can expect that parties sponsor protests in response
to fluctuations in their electoral fortunes. Thus, for both parties
in government and opposition, substantial changes in votes
should affect the likelihood of protest sponsorship.
3. ParlGov relies on expert surveys—for the most recent periods,
they rely on CHES data (Bakker et al., 2015).
4. Given that party organizations are relatively stable over time,
we take the party-specific mean in the case of parties covered
by both surveys. This information was missing for part of the
sample—see the next section and Online Appendix D.
5. We observe the same effect if we model the age of democracy
as a continuous predictor.
6. We also tested the average value instead of the median. The
results are robust to these different specifications (see Online
Appendix C).
7. For the interested reader, we include additional analysis on the
interaction between event and party characteristics in Online
Appendix E, Table 1.
8. Even if the party existed earlier, we only consider the
period after the Second World War, or if the country demo-
cratized latter, since the first democratic election the party
contested.
9. To reduce the sample to relevant observations and eliminate
very small formations, we excluded parties that did not sponsor
any protest events during the whole period of observation and
short-lived cabinets, during whose term there were no party-
sponsored protests. By dropping such periods, we minimize the
problems of underreporting party-sponsored protest events in
some countries and periods. However, note that in Online
Appendix D, we show that the effects we uncover are robust
to different specifications of the sample.
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